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ABSTRACT
The evolutionary game dynamics of social tolerance among het-
erogeneous economic agents have been discussed in an eco-
nomic interaction model with asymmetric social cost functions,
where the individual cost depends only on the share of intolerant
people in the opposite group. We show that, very different from
the symmetric function case studied previously , economic inter-
actions between individuals in a society with asymmetric social
cost functions can be exactly solved in phase plane, and rich
behaviours can be revealed by using algebraic approach. Our con-
tribution consists in offering the explicit formula of evolutionary
trajectories in the phase plane for the first time. The property of
equilibrium is shown to be closely related to the group popula-
tions. Based on the explicit formula in the phase plane, the equili-
briums of the evolutionary dynamics can be easily identified, and
the evolutionary trajectory can be exactly analysed. We also show
that the explicit solutions obtained would be especially suited to
effective control of the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance.
The necessary and sufficient conditions of the full tolerance equi-
librium under asymmetric social cost function are also discussed,
which provides guidance and reference to set policies and devel-
opment strategy of social tolerance.
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Tolerance, which is defined as a generic ability to accept diversity (Akerlof &
Kranton, 2000; Florida, 2004), has attracted more and more attention over the last
decade and is increasingly recognised as an important influence factor of economic
growth (Berggren & Elinder, 2012; Shi & Peng, 2014). Using empirical analysis, it has
been suggested that intolerant behaviour obstructs the free movement of talent
(Florida, 2004) and favours corruption and political patronage (Tabellini, 2010).
Moving from an intolerant to a tolerant society would always increase aggregate
income (Corneo & Jeanne, 2009), technological performance (Berggren & Nilsson,
2013) and social development (Bjørnskov, 2004).
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Assuming that all agents are purely driven by the economic incentive, the discussion
on tolerance at the individual level paves a path towards the control of tolerance,
explains many social phenomena related to tolerance (Garofalo, Di Dio, & Correani,
2010; Muldoon, Borgida, & Cuffaro, 2012; Shi & Pan, 2017a) and reveals that economic
reasoning can offer original and unique insights into the determinants of tolerance.
Evolutionary game theory is introduced to describe the dynamics of tolerance (Cerqueti,
Correani, & Garofalo, 2013; Garofalo et al., 2010). Consistent with the empirical results,
it has been demonstrated in the evolutionary game that a fully tolerant society assures
prosperity and that moving from intolerance to tolerance can increase income and social
development because intolerant behaviour reduces trust and cooperation among eco-
nomic agents, which consequently reduces the total welfare of the society.
Evolutionary game theory emphasises the dynamic process of adjustment and con-
vergence of behavioural decision making, which is very suitable for describing the
dynamics of tolerance in real economic life. It is well known that the economic agents
are often assumed to be completely rational in traditional game theory. However, the
complete rationality of the economic agents is difficult to achieve in real economic
life (Juul, Kianercy, Bernhardsson, & Pigolotti, 2013). Advantageously, evolutionary
game theory is based on ‘limited rationality’ and does not require complete rationality
of the economic agents. Evolutionary game theory combines game analysis with
dynamic evolution, and emphasises dynamic evolutionary equilibrium rather than
traditional static equilibrium (Nakajima & Masuda, 2015).
Recently, an evolutionary game model of tolerance among two group of heteroge-
neous economic agents has been studied (Cerqueti et al., 2013; Shi, Pan, & Peng, 2017)
by introducing a symmetric double-channel social cost function ciðx1; x2Þ, where x1 and
x2 are the share of tolerant agents in group 1 and group 2, respectively. We note that
the social cost function may be asymmetric in some cases (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000;
Garofalo et al., 2010), where the individual cost depends only on the share of intolerant
people in the opposite group. In the circumstances, the asymmetric social cost function






 0 and o2c2ox21  0; (3) c1 ¼
0 if x2 ¼ 1 and c2 ¼ 0 if x1 ¼ 1. Property (1) states that the social cost decreases when
the share of tolerant people in the opposite group increases. The second property put
convexity condition (in a single variable sense). Property (3) states that the social cost
becomes zero if there are no intolerant people in the opposite group. In general, the
cost may depend on both variables (Cerqueti et al., 2013), in such a case stronger condi-
tions are required for convexity. Obviously, the properties of such asymmetric social
cost function are quite different from the properties of the symmetric case (Cerqueti
et al., 2013), and it has been shown (Shi et al., 2017) that the asymmetric function may
give a reasonable description of politically separated groups. So it is interesting to study
the evolution of social tolerance in the asymmetric function case.
In the present work, the game of social tolerance among heterogeneous economic
agents in an economic interaction model with asymmetric social cost functions is dis-
cussed, and our contribution consists in offering the evolutionary trajectories in the
phase plane which are described by explicit formula for the first time. In fact, the
obtained explicit formula is one of only a few exact solutions in the topic of tolerance.
Due to the highly nonlinearity of the evolution equations, the explicit formula cannot
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be revealed using traditional dynamic analysis method or linearised equations of the
problem. Using the explicit formula, we show that the property of equilibriums
depends on not only the distribution of economic factors such as aggregate wealth and
social costs, but also the group populations. Based on the explicit formula in the phase
plane, the equilibriums of the evolutionary dynamics can be easily identified, and the
evolutionary trajectory can be exactly analysed. We also show that the explicit solutions
obtained would be especially suited to effective control of the evolutionary dynamics of
social tolerance. Finally, from the policy perspective, government policies favour a soci-
ety with full tolerance, which requires effective control of the evolutionary dynamics of
social tolerance. In our case, slope of the linear relation between x1 and x2 is shown to
be determined by population numbers of each group and the distribution of aggregate
wealth, which can be implemented via cultural and economic integration (Cerqueti
et al., 2013). The necessary and sufficient conditions of the full tolerance equilibrium
under asymmetric social cost function are also discussed, which provides guidance and
reference to set policies and development strategy of social tolerance.
Before passing to the process of constructing evolutionary dynamics, we would like
to highlight the difference between the present model and the model with local social
cost functions (Shi & Pan, 2017). In fact, the difference is twofold. First, in the model
with local social cost functions, the individual cost depends only on the share of
intolerant people in a person’s own group. Thus the individual cost comes from
within the group. The present model studies the other scenario that the individual
cost depends only on the share of intolerant people in the opposite group. In this
case, the individual cost comes from outside the group. Second, the model with local
social cost functions shows an exponential relationship between x1 and x2 in the
phase space, which makes it difficult to achieve effective control of the evolutionary
dynamics of social tolerance due to the irregular trajectory. In the present model, the
slope of the linear relation between x1 and x2 determined by population numbers of
each group and the distribution of aggregate wealth can be implemented via cultural
and economic integration (Cerqueti et al., 2013), which leads to effective control of
the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance.
2. Evolutionary game model of tolerance
To model the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance, we follow the model of
two groups discussed by Cerqueti et al. (2013), and the theory of replicators is
used that the strategy (tolerant and intolerant behaviour) that gives a higher pay-
off tends to spread in the society. We consider that N economic agents is divided
into two differentiated groups with the corresponding populations N1 and N2. The
populations of each group are assumed to be large enough and changeless with
time. Each agent can be tolerant or intolerant towards the agents of another
group, and the share of tolerant and intolerant agents in group i is indicated by
xi and ~xi, respectively, where ~xi denotes the share of intolerant agents in group i.
Two agents interact after being randomly matched, producing aggregate wealth
Rij ¼ Rji, which depends on the capital contribution of both agents. The capital con-
tribution of agents in group i is denoted by ki, and the relative capital contribution
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that agents in group i interact with agents in group j is defined as dij  ki=ðki þ kjÞ,
and determines the shares of the aggregate wealth Rij. That is, the agent in group i
shares dijRij when he interacts with the agent in group j. The social tolerance influ-
ences the net gain of each agent in the following cases: (1) If the two agents are of
the same group, then each agent obtains Rii=2; (2) If the two agents are of different
group and both tolerance, them suffer economic costs, including a psychological cost
and a social cost, with the exception of dijRij. The psychological cost is chosen to be
ai ¼ Rii=2 (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Cerqueti et al., 2013) in terms of loss of iden-
tity. The social cost, which describes the social reaction of intolerant agents adverse
to the agents of the opposite group, is chosen to be asymmetric here. In the present
work, simple asymmetric social cost functions c1 ¼ bð1x2Þ and c2 ¼ bð1x1Þ are
used in comparison to the symmetric double-channel function ci ¼ bð1x1x2Þ used
by Cerqueti et al. (2013); (3) If the two agents are of different group, no wealth is
produced if any of them is intolerant.
According to the theory of replicators which has a good feature to provide an
intuitive and meaningful economic analysis, the evolutionary dynamics of social toler-
ance can be described by
_xi ¼ xi~xi E Rxið ÞE R~xið Þ½ ; (1)
where EðRxiÞ and EðR~xiÞ are the expected net gain of tolerant and intolerant individu-
als in group i, respectively. We should note that the theory of replicators requires a
large population, and the game model (2) implicitly assumes that tolerant and intoler-
ant behaviour spreads based on the payoff of two strategies. According to the normal-
isation condition, we have xi þ ~xi ¼ 1 and xi; ~xi 2 ½0; 1, for each i ¼ 1; 2.
Considering the randomly match, in which all agents have the same probability to
be selected, and we denote Pxixj (or Pxi~xj) the probability for a tolerant agent of group
i matches a tolerant (or intolerant) agent of group j, then these expected net gains
can be calculated as follows:
E Rx1ð Þ ¼ Px1x1R11=2þ Px1~x1R11=2þ d12R12R11=2b 1x2ð Þ
 
Px1x2 ;
E Rx2ð Þ ¼ Px2x2R22=2þ Px2~x2R22=2þ d21R21R22=2b 1x1ð Þ
 
Px2x1 ;
E R~x1ð Þ ¼ P~x1x1R11=2þ P~x1~x1R11=2;
E R~x2ð Þ ¼ P~x2x2R22=2þ P~x2~x2R22=2;
(2)
where d12 þ d21 ¼ 1, and the randomly match probabilities are
Px1x1 ¼
x1N11
N  1 ; Px1~x1 ¼
~x1N1
N  1 ; Px1x2 ¼
x2N2
N  1 ; Px1~x2 ¼
~x2N2
N  1 ;
P~x1x1 ¼
x1N1
N  1 ; P~x1~x1 ¼
~x1N11
N  1 ; P~x1x2 ¼
x2N2
N  1 ; P~x1~x2 ¼
~x2N2
N  1 ;
Px2x1 ¼
x1N1
N  1 ; Px2~x1 ¼
~x1N1
N  1 ; Px2x2 ¼
x2N21
N  1 ; Px2~x2 ¼
~x2N2
N  1 ;
P~x2x1 ¼
x1N1
N  1 ; P~x2~x1 ¼
~x1N1
N  1 ; P~x2x2 ¼
x2N2
N  1 ; P~x2~x2 ¼
~x2N21
N  1 :
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Given the above expected net gains, the motion of tolerant population with respect
to time will be then modelled by the following differential equations:
_x1 ¼ x1~x1x2N2N  1 d12R12R11=2b 1x2ð Þ
 
;




These equations give a complete description of the evolutionary dynamics of social
tolerance. The equilibriums of Equations (3) are:
P1 ¼ 1; 1ð Þ; P2 ¼ n1; 0ð Þ; P3 ¼ 0; n2ð Þ; P4 ¼ 1X2; 1X1ð Þ; P5 ¼ 0; 0ð Þ;
where X1 ¼ ½d12R12R11=2=b, X2 ¼ ½d21R21R22=2=b, and n1; n2 2 ð0; 1 are arbi-
trary constants. There are two more equilibriums P6 ¼ ð1; n3Þ and P7 ¼ ðn4; 1Þ with
n3; n4 2 ð0; 1 if X1 ¼ 0 and X2 ¼ 0, respectively. These equilibriums have precise
economic and social meanings. For example, P1 is the full tolerance equilibrium, P2
and P3 depict situations that one group is wholly populated by intolerant agents while
another group is arbitrary tolerant.
3. Solutions in the phase plane
In comparison to the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance under double-channel
functions ci ¼ bð1x1x2Þ discussed by Cerqueti et al. (2013), Equations (3) which
describe the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance under asymmetric social cost
function is integrable. In what follows, we give a description of the derivation of the
solution in phase space.
Proposition 1. The solution of evolutionary social tolerance under asymmetric social
cost function in phase plane is
exp N1x1N2x2ð Þ 1x1ð ÞN1X2 ¼ C 1x2ð ÞN2X1 ; (4)
where C is an integration constant that depends on initial values.
Proof. In the phase space, Equations (3) become:
x1 1X2ð Þ
x̂1N2
dx1 ¼ x2 1X1ð Þx̂2N1 dx2; (5)
Integration of Equation (5) and using the following formulas
Ð x1 1X2ð Þ
x1  1 dx1 ¼ x1 þ X2 ln jx1  1j;
Ð x2 1X1ð Þ
x2  1 dx2 ¼ x2 þ X1 ln jx2  1j;
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we can obtain
x1 þ X2 ln jx1  1j ¼ N2N1 x2 þ X1 ln jx2  1j½  þ C:
After some simplification we obtain Equation (4).
4. Applications of the explicit solutions in the phase plane
The applications of the explicit formula derived are twofold. First, the steady states of
the evolutionary dynamics can be easily identified from the solution in phase plane,
and the evolutionary trajectory in the phase plane can be exactly analysed. Second,
the explicit solutions obtained would be especially suited to effective control of the
evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance.
Here we take the steady state (1, 0.5) as an example to illustrate the first applica-
tion. From the initial value x1 ¼ 1 one can easily determine the integration constant
as C ¼ 0. In this case the solution of evolutionary social tolerance under asymmetric
social cost function in phase plane becomes exp ðN1x1N2x2Þð1x1ÞN1X2 ¼ 0. Due to
the non-zero characteristics of exp ðN1x1N2x2Þ, we can obtain that x1  1, which is
stable and not changing with time. Furthermore, using the same method, two general
steady states P6 ¼ ð1; n3Þ and P7 ¼ ðn4; 1Þ with n3; n4 2 ð0; 1 can be easily deter-
mined to be stable.
The evolutionary trajectories in the phase plane can also be obtained by using
the explicit solution. For a more general form, Equation (4) in phase space is
shown in Figure 1 with the parameters N2=N1 ¼ 1 and C ¼ 0:2. We can clearly
identify the steady states P1, P2, P3 and P4 for the case X2 ¼ 0:5, and we can see
that the steady state P4 is a saddle point here. Comparison between the evolution-
ary trajectories for X2 ¼ 0:5 and X2 ¼ 0:8 shows that the evolutionary dynamics is
sensitively dependent on X1 and X2, which are determined by population numbers
of each group and the distribution of aggregate wealth.
The existence of multiple steady states always leads to complex trajectories. In fact,
it may be quite difficult to give an analytical description of the evolutionary dynam-
ics. This difficulty exists extensively within many subjects, including engineering
Figure 1. Different solutions of evolutionary social tolerance in phase plane.
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science and physics (Xiong et al., 2012). Traditional way of dealing with such issue is
the perturbation method which requires the uniform stability of the steady states.
According to the Kolmogorov–Arnold–Moser theorem, the evolutionary trajectories are
confined to closed tori that translate into regular closed orbits on Poincare sections for a
regular oscillation due to the integrability of evolutionary dynamics in the present case
(Xiong & Wu, 2018; You, 1999), and our results provides the possibility for the analytical
description of the evolutionary dynamics of social tolerance.
Now we turn to show the second application that the explicit solutions obtained
would be especially suited for effective control of the evolutionary dynamics of social tol-
erance. In fact, evolutionary trajectories in the phase space give the relationship between
social tolerances of the two groups, which is quite important in tolerance control.
Usually, the relationship between social tolerances of the two groups is complicated
and rising or falling trends can be discussed. For some parameters, the relationship
between social tolerances of the two groups becomes linear, and in this case one can
easily achieve tolerance control via economic integration (Shi & Peng, 2014). Here a
typical example is shown in Figure 2 with the parameters N2=N1 ¼ 5, X2 ¼ 0:5, and
C ¼ 0:002, and we find a linear relation between x1 and x2 in the phase space when
x1 and x2 are both small. Such a linear relation between x1 and x2 in the phase space
can be analytically confirmed via the explicit formula (4). The slope of the linear rela-
tion between x1 and x2 is determined by X1 and X2, which are determined by popu-
lation numbers of each group and the distribution of aggregate wealth.
Population numbers of each group are crucial for the evolutionary dynamics of
social tolerance. However, these contents have not been well discussed (Akerlof &
Kranton, 2000; Cerqueti et al., 2013; Shi & Pan, 2018b). In what follows, we will
show that tolerance control also can be achieved by the adjustment of population
numbers of each group. Here we take the parameter case N2  N1 as an example.
For the case N2  N1, the solution (4) becomes x1 þ X2 ln jx1  1j ¼ C þ
oðN2=N1Þ where the value of x1 depend mainly upon the integration constant. In this
case, the variation range of x1 is quite narrow and can be well controlled. A similar
situation occurs when N2  N1 where the variations range of x2 is quite narrow.
Evolutionary trajectories of x1 and x2 in the phase space are shown in Figure 3
with the parameters N2=N1 ¼ 0:1, X2 ¼ 0:5, and C ¼ 0:2. We confirm that the































Figure 2. Linear relationship between x2 and x1 in the phase space.
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variation range of x1 in these evolutionary trajectories are indeed quite narrow,
although X1 range from 0.1 to 0.9.
5. Necessary and sufficient conditions of full tolerance steady state
The full tolerance steady state ð1; 1Þ is of particular interest. In this section we focus
our attention on discussing the necessary condition and sufficient condition of the
full tolerance steady state ð1; 1Þ.
Proposition 2. The necessary condition of achieving full tolerance is
R11 þ R222R12<0
Proof. To verify the stability of steady state ð1; 1Þ, we linearised the evolution Equation
(3) by introducing infinitesimals dx1 and dx2 around the steady state:
d _x1 ¼ k1dx1; d _x2 ¼ k2dx2; (7)
where
k1 ¼ d12R12R11=2ð ÞN2N  1 ;k2 ¼
d21R21R22=2ð ÞN1
N  1 ;
The solutions of Equations (7) are
dx1 / exp k1tð Þ; dx2 / exp k2tð Þ (8)
The necessary conditions of achieving full tolerance are k1>0 and k2>0. After
some simplification we obtain Inequality (6).
The economics meaning is that tolerance is impossible if R11 þ R222R12>0 where
R12 is not sufficiently high to produce a tendency of mixed interaction in economic
incentive. This necessary condition of achieving full tolerance is exactly the result



































Figure 3. Evolutionary trajectories in the phase space
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obtained by Cerqueti et al. (2013). In fact, sufficient conditions of achieving full toler-
ance are in the same situation (Shi & Pan, 2018a). A sufficient condition of achieving
full tolerance is also summarised as follows:




Proof. According to Equations 3, d12R12R11=2b>0 ensures _x1>0 for any x1 while
d21R21R22=2b>0 ensures _x2>0 for any x2, so the inequalities d12R12R11=2b>0
and d21R21R22=2b>0 give a sufficient condition of achieving full tolerance at any
starting point. After some simplification we can obtain Inequality (9).
6. Conclusions
The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents is an
interesting topic in both economics and sociology, and several theoretical approaches
have been proposed recently. We discuss the dynamics of social tolerance among het-
erogeneous economic agents in an economic interaction model with asymmetric
social cost functions, which is very different from the double-channel function case
discussed by Cerqueti et al. (2013). In the economic interaction model with asymmet-
ric social cost functions, the evolutionary trajectories can be exactly solved in the
phase plane, and we obtain an explicit formula for the evolutionary trajectories in the
phase plane. We show that the property of equilibriums depends on not only the dis-
tribution of economic factors such as aggregate wealth and social costs, but also the
group populations. It is worth noting that the explicit formula cannot be revealed
using traditional dynamic analysis method or linearised equations of the problem,
due to the highly nonlinearity of the evolution equations. The applications of the
solution in the phase plane are discussed, and we show that the equilibriums of the
evolutionary dynamics can be easily identified and analysed from the solution in
phase plane, which would be especially suited to effective control of the evolutionary
dynamics of social tolerance. Especially, the slope of the linear relation between x1
and x2 is shown to be determined by population numbers of each group and the dis-
tribution of aggregate wealth, which can be implemented via cultural and economic
integration (Cerqueti et al., 2013). The necessary and sufficient conditions of the full
tolerance equilibrium under asymmetric social cost function are also discussed, which
provides guidance and reference to set policies and development strategy of social tol-
erance that a lower social cost (determined by Equation (9)) gives a sufficient condi-
tion of achieving full tolerance at any starting point.
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